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Although farmers tend to be tied to the land and to be somewhat geographically immobile, off-
farm work of farmers is a relatively common international phenomena.  In all of the developed
countries since the 1950s or 1960s, the aggregate demand for operator and family labor has declined
(OECD 1994,1995), the demand for housework has also declined as family size has declined and labor
saving household technologies have been adopted, and the real nonfarm wage has generally increased. 
Facing adjustments in labor allocation, farm households in developed countries frequently choose to
continue in farming but to supply some labor to the nonfarm sector, e.g., OECD 1994; Hallberg, et. Al
1991).  As agriculture continues to adjust to new farm and trade policies and new technologies, a
better understanding of the economics of time allocation seems to hold important implications for the
well-being of farm people.
The objective of this paper is to present new econometric evidence for off-farm work
participation, off-farm hours of work, and on-farm hours of work for U.S. farm operators.  The closely
related literature for U.S. farmers has focused on off-farm work but not generally combined an
examination of on-farm and off-farm work together (e.g., see Gould and Saupe; Huffman and Lange;
Jensen and Salant; Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg 1989; Sumner 1982). The analysis unfolds in three
sections.  See Huffman and El-Osta 1997 for additional details.ln WOL ￿ S￿L￿￿ ￿ ￿OL
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The Economic and Econometric Model
An agricultural household model provides the conceptual framework for predications about
farmers’ farm and off-farm work participation and hours of work decisions (see Huffman 1980;
Strauss; Huffman 1991; Huffman 1996).  The conceptual model is implemented through the empirical
specification of equations for off-farm participation and off-farm and on-farm work hours for farm
operators.  Define the empirical off-farm wage (W ) and reservation wage (W ) equations for the j-th mj rj
farm operator as follows:
(1)
(2)
where ￿  and ￿  are zero mean random disturbance terms for the population of all farm operators.  mj rj
Operators are assumed to participate in off-farm work when their reservation wage is less than their
market wage offer.  Hence, define an off-farm wage work participation indicator variable D as: j
D =   . (3) j
Because ￿  and ￿  are random, the probability of off-farm work participation is obtained as: mj rj
(4)
where   and F( ) is a cumulative distribution function for the random
variable /.  Equation (4) is a reduced-form off-farm wage work participation equation where the
explanatory variables S are from the market wage and reservation wage equations (1) and (2).  If we j
have a consistent estimate of the wage equation for off-farm work for all farm operators, then we can
use   as regressors in a structural off-farm work participation equation.  An off-farm
wage increase is expected to increase the probability of off-farm wage work.Tf ￿ ￿11 Wm ￿ Z1 ￿1 ￿ µf
Tm ￿ ￿12 Wm ￿ ￿22 V ￿ Z2 ￿2 ￿ µm







For the hours of work component of this study, two sets of behavioral equations are
considered.  For farm operators that participate in off-farm wage work, we will estimate on-farm labor
demand and off-farm labor supply equations:
(5)
(6)
where Z  includes regressors other than W  that are expected to explain on-farm labor demand, Z   1m 2
includes regressors other than W  and V that are expected to explain off-farm labor supply, and µ  and m f
µ  are random disturbance terms.  Consistent with our theory, other income (V) does not enter the on- m
farm labor demand equation (5).  In equation (5), we expect the sign of ￿  to be negative, and in 11
equation (6), we expect ￿  to be negative (i.e., leisure is a normal good) and ￿  to be non-negative.  22 12
With ￿ > 0, the income effect of a wage rate change and the substitution effect pull in the opposite 12 
direction but the substitution effect dominates.
For farm operators that do not participate in off-farm wage work, we will estimate an on-farm
labor demand equation:
(7)
where Z  is regressors other than V that are expected to explain on-farm hours and   is a random 3
disturbance term.  Consistent with theory, Z  is different from Z  because the demand for operator’s 31
on-farm work is not separable from household consumption decisions.  In particular, other income (V)
is a regressor in the on-farm demand equation (7) but not in (5), and we expect ￿  to be negative 1
(leisure is a normal good) in equation (7).
A brief empirical definition of all variables included in the econometric model is presented in
table 1.  Some of the variables are farm/farmer specific and others represent state or regional effects.  ￿
Furthermore, to complete the specification of the econometric model, we designate the variables that
are included in Z , Z , and Z .  Exactly what farm attributes should be included is subject to debate, 12 3
e.g., Huffman 1991; Lass, Findies, and Hallberg 1989, 1991; Lass and Gempesaw 1992;  Kimhi 1994. 
Attributes that should be included are quasi-fixed or exogenous to off-farm participation and hours of
on- and off-farm work decisions of farm operators.  To accommodate divergent views on this subject,
we proceed under two different assumptions.  Assumption 1: the value of farmland owned (LAND),
which is an instrument for farmland, and value of farm capital in machinery and equipment, breeding
stock, and farm buildings (FCAPITAL) are to be included in Z , Z , and Z .  Hence, on-farm and off- 12 3
farm work decisions are conditional on LAND and FCAPITAL. Assumption 2: LAND and
FCAPITAL are attributes that are jointly determined with farm operator’s off-farm participation and
on- and off-farm hours, and they are excluded from Z , Z , and Z . 12 3
Additional variables included in Z  are: EDS, wife’s education is an indicator of the potential 1
productivity/opportunity cost of her time; FRAISED, an indicator of early farm-specific work
experiences of the farm operator; FHEALIM, an indicator of a health limiting condition of the farm
operator; MILESCITY, an indicator of potential commuting distance to off-farm work and to
shopping for farm and household goods and services; FARMWAGE, state wage rate for hired farm
labor; RAIN and JANT, state climatic indicators that can be expected to affect farm productivity; and
NE, MIDWEST, and WEST, regional geographic indicators for real output and nonlabor input prices. 
Additional variables included in Z  are: EDS, FRAISED, FHEALIM, HHSIZE, MILESCITY, 2
FARMWAGE, RAIN, JANT, NE, MIDWEST, and WEST.  Additional variables included in Z  are: 3
AGE, an indicator of life stage of operator and taste for consumption of leisure relative to purchased￿
goods; ED and EDS, indicators of potential productivity of husband’s and wife’s time; and FRAISED;
FHEALIM; HHSIZE; MILESCITY; FARMWAGE; RAIN; JANT; NE; MIDWEST; and WEST.
In the operator’s off-farm wage equation (1), S  includes his education (ED), his potential 1
post-schooling experience (EXP) and state amenity factors associated with winter weather (JANT,
JANT ), state labor market conditions, PURATE and ESHOCK, and regional dummy variables.   EXP
2
is chosen over actual labor market experience because it is less likely to be endogenous to off-farm
work decisions (Mroz).  EXP is expected to have a quadratic effect on ln W because of finite length
human life (Becker 1993).  Other studies have shown that state labor markets are interrelated through
migration and migrants attempt to equalize real compensation.  Nominal wage rate differences then
exist across states because of cost of living and amenity differences (Tolley 1974; Kenny and Denslow
1980) and because of permanent and transitory labor market adjustments (Topel).  Topel and Tokle
and Huffman found that nonfarm wage rates were higher, other things equal, where predicted state
unemployment rates were high.  The higher wage rates compensated for anticipated future
unemployment.  Some labor market events are unanticipated, and they may affect wage rates, too.  In
the reduced-form off-farm participation equation, the set of regressors (S) are approximately the set of
variables S , V, and Z . 12
The Data and Empirical Results
The econometric model is to be fitted to the sample of farm operator in the USDA’s 1991
Farm Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS).  A major advantage of this sample is its large size and
nationally representative base, but we also discuss some of the imperfections in the design.  We
augment the FCRS with selected state economic data.  See table 1 for sample means of variables for
different subgroups of farm operators.￿
The econometric model consists of equations (1),(4)-(7).  They are reduced-form and
structural logit off-farm participation equations which are fitted to the whole sample.  For farm
operators that participate in off-farm work, the econometric model also consists of an off-farm wage
equation, an on-farm hours of work and off-farm hours of work equation.  For farm operators who do
not participate in off-farm work, the econometric model consists of an on-farm hours of work
equation, which has a different specification than for off-farm participants.  Potential sample selectivity
in the wage and hours equations is considered (e.g., Heckman 1979; Lee; Newey et.at.) but the
uncorrected estimates seemed better statistically and economically. 
Reduced-form off-farm labor participation.  The results from fitting the reduced-form logit off-farm
work participation equation to data for 2,076 U.S. farm operators are reported in columns (1) and (2) of
table 2.  The two equations differ in treatment of farm land and farm capital; assumption 1 applies to
column (1) and assumption 2 applies to column (2).  .#0& CPF (%#2+6#. JCXG UVTQPI PGICVKXG
GHHGEVU YJGP KPENWFGF￿  The effects of other income, operator’s age and education are very much as
expected.  Being farm raised and having a health limitation reduces the probability of off-farm work.
1HH￿HCTO YCIG￿NCDQT FGOCPF￿ 6JG QHH￿HCTO YCIG GSWCVKQP KU HKVVGF VQ ￿￿￿ QDUGTXCVKQPU QP OCNG
HCTO QRGTCVQTU VJCV TGRQTVGF QHH￿HCTO GCTPKPIU KP ￿￿￿￿￿ 6JG TGUWNVU CTG TGRQTVGF KP EQNWOP ￿￿￿￿ VCDNG
￿￿ 6JG HCTO QRGTCVQTIU QHH￿HCTO YCIG GSWCVKQP KU QH KPVGTGUV DGECWUG VJG RTGFKEVGF YCIG KU CP
KPUVTWOGPV HQT VJG CEVWCN QT RQVGPVKCN QHH￿HCTO YCIG QH HCTOGTU￿ +V￿ CNUQ￿ RTQXKFGU GXKFGPEG QP VJG
TGVWTPU VQ JWOCP ECRKVCN QH HCTO QRGTCVQTU KP VJG PQPHCTO NCDQT OCTMGV￿ YJKEJ UGGOU VQ JCXG KPETGCUGF
UKPEG ￿￿￿￿ ￿,WJP GV￿CN￿￿￿
Structural off-farm participation equation. The results from fitting the structural logit off-farm wage
work participation equation for farm operators is reported in table 2, columns (3) and (4).  This equation￿
differs from the reduced-form off-farm participation equations in that the off-farm wage rate is predicted
for all sample operators using equation (5), table 2, and included as a regressor, and regressors that enter
only the off-farm wage equation are excluded.  In the structural participation equation, operator’s off-farm
wage and other income have strong effects.  At the sample mean, a $1 per hours increase in the operator’s
off-farm wage increases his probability of off-farm work by 3.4 percent.  A $1,000 increase in other
income deceases the probability by 0.5 percent.
Off-farm and on-farm hours: Off-farm work participants. The off-farm labor supply and on-farm
labor demand equations are fitted to data for the 551 observations on farm operators who participated in
off-farm work.  In table 3, columns (1)-(4), results are reported for assumption 1 and 2 about LAND and
FCAPITAL.  The equations are fitted without a sample selection variable.  Nawata and Nagase (1996)
show that Heckman’s two-step procedure (Heckman 1979) for sample selection correction sometimes
yields highly biased parameter estimates.  This occurs when the sample selection variable is highly
correlated with the other regressors included in the behavioral equation of interest. 
For these farmers, the results show their hours of on-farm work are unresponsive to the off-farm
wage, but their off-farm hours respond positively.  At the mean, the compensated own-wage elasticity of
off-farm hours is 0.16.  The income elasticity of off-farm hours is -0.018.  Furthermore, the size of the
wage and income elasticity estimates is insensitive to including or excluding farm land and farm capital as
regressors.
On-farm hours: No off-farm work. The on-farm labor demand equation is fitted to 1,525 observations
on farm operators who specialize in farm work.  In table 3, columns (5) and (6), results are reported for
assumptions 1 and 2 about LAND and FCAPITAL.  For these operators, the income elasticity of  demand
for on-farm hours is negative, -0.015.￿
Conclusions 
Overall, our results show strong effects of economic variables on the probability of off-farm work
of farmers whish is similar to nonfarm wage earners (Heckman 1993).   Farmers’ on-farm and off-farm
hours are also shown not to be exogenous to farm and nonfarm economic variables, and they respond in
reasonable economic directions.  Furthermore, farmers with better off-farm wage opportunities, e.g., more
education, show increased probability and increased hours of off-farm work.  Thus, off-farm work is an
important avenue for structural adjustment in agriculture  (Gardner 1992; OECD 1994) and rural areas
(Huang and Orazem).
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 Table 1.  Variable names and sample mean values, U.S. farm operators by off-farm work status, 1991.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
         Farm operators  (mean)      
Variable symbols Variable definition No off-farm  With off-farm
     work   wage work _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
D 1 if farm operator worked off-farm for a wage or salary in 1991; 0 otherwise 0 1.0
OFFHOURS Farm operator’s annual hours of off-farm wage or salary work in 1991 0 1,895
FARMHOURS Farm operator’s annual hours of own on-farm or ranch work in 1991 2,041 1,111
OFFWAGE Off-farm wage = gross cash wages, salaries, commissions, including cash --- 14.07
bonuses, from working off own farm in 1991 divided by OFFHOURS, $/hr
OTHINC Farm operator household’s other income = total household cash income less 15,329 4,256
net farm income and gross cash wages, salaries, tips, commissions and
cash bonuses for work off own farm by operator and his wife in 1991 ($)
AGE Farm operator’s age 57.7 47.2
ED Years of schooling completed by farm operator 12.4 13.0
EDS Years of schooling completed by wife of farm operator 12.7 13.1
EXP Farm operator’s potential post-schooling experience = AGE - ED - 6 39.3 28.19
FRAISED 1 if farm operator was raised on a farm; 0 otherwise 0.83 0.72
FHEALIM 1 if operator has any chronic health problems that limit amount or kind of   0.14  0.04 
a
farm work; 0 otherwise
HHSIZE Number of persons who live in the household 2.87 3.50
MILESCITY Miles from farm to nearest city having population of at least 10,000 25.6 23.1Table 1.   (continued)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
         Farm operators  (mean)      
Variable symbols Variable definition No off-farm  With off-farm
     work   wage work _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
LAND Value of farmland owned = value of farmland owned 12-31-91 less 218.2 87.2
expenditures for construction, repairs and maintenance during 1991, $1000
FCAPITAL Value of farm machinery and equipment, breeding stock, and farm 129.4 49.7
buildings (excluding the farm dwelling), 1-1-91, $1000
FARMWAGE State average wage rate for hired farm labor in 1991 ($) 5.94 5.95
RAIN State normal annual precipitation (divided by 12) [Teigen] 3.02 3.17
JANT State normal January average temperature (degree F) [Weiss et al.] 31.6 32.1
PURATE Predicted or anticipated state unemployment rate.  Prediction obtained from 5.58 5.81
OLS regression of state annual unemployment rate on intercept, trend, and
trend squared, 1967-1991.
ESHOCK Relative state employment growth shock.  OLS residual from state annual    2.78 2.60
employment equation less OLS residual from national annual employment 
equation, 1967-1991.
NE 1 if household is located in Northeast Census region; 0 otherwise 0.06 0.04
MIDWEST 1 if household is located in Midwest Census region; 0 otherwise 0.45 0.41
WEST 1 if household is located in West Census region; 0 otherwise 0.12 0.12
SOUTH 1 if household is located in South Census region; 0 otherwise 0.37 0.42
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Sample Size 1,525 551
Population 863,939 504,130
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a Variable has a coefficient of variation equal to 28%. Table 2. Estimated coefficients for off-farm wage labor participation and off-farm wage
equations:  U.S. farm operators, 1991 (adjusted t-ratios in parentheses)
____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________
             Off-Farm Wage Labor Participation                        Off-Farm
 Regressors Reduced-form Equation     Structural Equation   Wage Eq. 
1
   (1)    (2)      (3)    (4)        (5) __________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________
OTHINC -3.75 x 10
-3 -3.39 x 10
-5 -5.76 x 10
-5 -5.38 x 10
-5
(3.63) (3.72) (4.86) (4.90)
OTHINC
2/1000 3.97 x 10
-8 3.44 x 10
-8 6.59 x 10
-8 6.09 x 10
-8






ED 0.117 0.098 0.086
(2.47) (2.12) (4.70)
EDS -0.020 -0.068 -1.11 x 10
-3 -0.062






FRAISED -0.387 -0.717 -0.351 -0.692
(1.60) (3.17) (1.48) (3.12)
FHEALIM -0.701 -0.637 -0.786 -0.718
(2.16) (1.96) (2.34) (2.15)
HHSIZE 0.090 0.091 0.211 0.216
(1.29) (1.48) (3.43) (3.85)
MILESCITY 7.78 x 10
-4 -1.13 x 10
-3 -1.08 x 10
-4 -2.72 x 10
-3
(0.22) (0.33) (0.03) (0.81)
LAND -6.28 x 10
-4 -9.74 x 10
-4
(1.29) (1.92)
FCAPITAL -9.49 x 10
-3 -8.84 x 10
-3
(5.88) (5.72) Table 2. (continued)
____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________
             Off-Farm Wage Labor Participation                        Off-Farm
 Regressors Reduced-form Equation      Structural Equation   Wage Eq. 
1
   (1)    (2)      (3)    (4)       (5) __________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________
FARMWAGE 0.526 0.582 0.517 0.524
(1.69) (2.09) (1.72) (1.93)
RAIN 0.281 0.281 0.389 0.436
(1.72) (1.78) (2.47) (2.88)
JANT -0.013 0.014 -0.067 -0.056 -0.017
(0.29) (0.36) (4.49) (4.00) (1.42)
JANT
2/100 -0.071 -0.090 0.023
(1.17) (1.62) (1.11)
PURATE 0.128 0.146 0.098
(1.63) (1.87) (2.73)
ESHOCK -0.071 -0.064 -0.049
(1.89) (1.84) (2.74)
NE -1.690 -1.901 -2.290 -2.482 0.190
(2.81) (3.90) (3.89) (5.17) (1.06)
MIDWEST -1.023 -1.056 -1.209 -1.223 0.037
(2.61) (2.87) (2.97) (3.23) (0.33)
WEST 0.258 0.023 -0.148 -0.250 0.237




Intercept -11.70 -11.11 -3.405 -3.435 0.631
(4.53) (4.89) (1.94) (2.23) (1.61) ________________________________________________________________________________________
X
2-statistic 155.6 144.8 167.5 159.7 --
McFadden’s R
2  0.323 0.230 0.281 0.185
R
2 0.206
Sample 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 551
________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Dependent variable is Rn(OFFWAGE).
2 Wage is predicted for all farm operators using column (5) of the table. Table 3. Estimated coefficients for off-farm labor supply and on-farm labor demand
equations:  U.S. farm operators, 1991 (adjusted t-ratios in parentheses)
________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________
     Farm operators reporting off-farm wage work       No off-farm wage work
        Assumption 1                Assumption 2        Asspt. 1 Asspt. 2
Off-farm On-farm Off-farm On-farm On-farm On-farm
 Regressors    hours   hours    hours   hours    hours   hours ________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________
OFFWAGE 
a 25.30 1.95 24.54 -1.36
(1.84) (0.15) (1.77) (0.09)
OTHINC -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002





EDS 11.16 -21.13 9.68 -18.33 35.38 54.66
(0.50) (-0.86) (0.41) (0.67) (1.29) (1.94)
FRAISED -26.28 207.61 -60.69 280.13 404.25 473.49
(0.28) (2.34) (0.66) (2.79) (3.10) (3.52)
FHEALIM -103.75 205.60 -77.95 161.51 -341.04 -389.03
(0.45) (0.85) (0.34) (0.63) (2.75) (3.07)
HHSIZE -26.34 -18.68 8.50 18.10
(0.95) (0.66) (0.18) (0.37)
MILESCITY -4.82 4.90 -5.28 5.58 2.22 2.07
(3.05) (2.92) (3.32) (2.96) (1.10) (1.00)
LAND 0.023 -0.72 0.15
(0.09) (2.27) (1.55)
FCAPITAL -1.57 4.30 0.83
(2.75) (4.01) (2.06)
FARMWAGE -123.84 45.57 -121.61 20.51 -12.26 -12.52
(1.01) (0.36) (0.96) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
RAIN -54.05 -99.72 -36.69 -127.02 42.14 44.01
(0.90) (1.52) (0.61) (1.84) (0.57) (0.58)
JANT 19.49 -10.71 20.13 -13.01 -12.85 -13.75
(3.42) (1.66) (3.41) (1.83) (1.78) (1.86)
NE 175.28 69.23 144.30 115.49 400.77 441.45
(0.73) (0.24) (0.60) (0.37) (1.60) (1.69)
MIDWEST 241.83 -46.47 233.14 -30.09 257.88 275.00
(1.39) (0.25) (1.31) (0.14) (1.15) (1.76)
WEST -92.67 -332.73 -68.39 -407.82 206.64 294.82
(0.50) (1.65) (0.37) (1.86) (0.85) (1.18)
Intercept 1,977.4 1,387.5 1,857.45 1,783.87 2,442.62 2,172.29
(2.51) (1.78) (2.24) (2.08) (2.41) (2.01)
R
2 0.140 0.257 0.112 0.131 0.295 0.254
Sample size 551 551 551 551 1,525 1,525
________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________
a The wage is predicted using the estimates from table 2, column 5.